As I go around the country looking for assets to acquire for our Asian wealth management group, it is becoming ever more clear that we are reaching the upper levels of sound valuation. As I am sure most of you know, there is little distressed assets left that have any reason to be acquired, and it is only the odd situation that makes the grade. Even in secondary markets, where there is a chance sometimes to find an off market situation due to special circumstances with the current partners or some other event, it is now more likely that even here, the asset will end up going to market in some limited way pushing the price higher than is good for the buyer. I am involved in two of those situations right now. The seller in each case was seemingly ready to do an off market deal, and then a lawyer or someone else intervened and said put it out to market and bid.

Everyone I speak to who has been around for several cycles, not just the crash, is feeling like we maybe have one or two years left, and that is only due to the manipulated low rates, and the enormous rush of capital, mainly offshore money, that is keeping the bubble inflated. Some of the really smart owners are now net sellers. The trend is just beginning, but as the yea r progresses and we get to 2016, and as rates start to rise, there will be more net sellers. Some of the funds are realizing it is time to begin to harvest the large gains they have in their portfolios now and to lock in those 20% bonus payments from the fund.

Lenders are starting to do all of the same dumb things they did every prior cycle. Underwriting is slipping. There is some proforma based lending , and quality of the sponsor is totally out the door. I am watching some really bad actors get big loans from some very smart lenders. The lenders are making the same old mistakes of believing their docs are solid and their collateral position is good. They forget that the bad guys do not care what the docs say and when the balloon bursts, the collateral is worth a lot less than they thought. Based on my own experience as a plaintiff and as an expert witness, I have watched how no matter what the docs say, the bad actors will lie and their lawyers will swear to it. They will concoct interpretations of clauses that nobody ever imagined, but they will use this as an aggressive litigation strategy to force a settlement so they view it as investing in lawyers to bet a much bigger deduct in what they owe as the return on investment. In the end if the case goes all the way as I pushed mine against Stan Thomas, the good guys win, but 95% of cases settle and that is exactly what the bad guys count on.

After 50 years of doing deals, the one certainty is that things never change. Sometimes not even the faces change. One lesson I learned is the con men keep coming back and otherwise smart investors and lenders fall for the new story. Inevitably it goes bad, but back they come. The way I know we are nearing the end of the bubble is watching who is getting big investors and lenders to give them money again. In 2010 when the first capital began to creep back into the market, the sponsor was everything. Bad guys could not get any money. Now we have moved the cycle to where the worst guys are getting their deals financed and it is back to 2006 again.

We likely have another 18-24 months to go, maybe a bit longer, but the bubble is nearing the burst point. If the Fed were to really raise rates, it would be here now, but the high dollar is keeping the game going by restraining the Fed. The black swans continue to multiply and some really bad things are brewing that Obama just does not understand. Be prepared for cycle to turn, and consider being a seller while we are at the high. The old pigs and hogs saying.

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Joel Ross

Joel Ross began his career in Wall St as an investment banker in 1965, handling corporate advisory matters for a variety of clients. During the seventies he was CEO of North American operations for a UK based conglomerate, and sat on the parent company board. In 1981, he began his own firm handling leveraged buyouts, investment banking and real estate financing. In 1984 Ross began providing investment banking services and arranging financing for real estate transactions with his own firm, Ross Properties, Inc. In 1993 Ross and a partner, Lexington Mortgage, created the first Wall St hotel CMBS program in conjunction with Nomura. They went on to develop a similar CMBS program for another major Wall St investment bank and for five leading hotel companies. Lexington, in partnership with Mr. Ross established a hotel mortgage bank table funded by an investment bank, and making all CMBS hotel loans on their behalf. In 1999 he formed Citadel Realty Advisors as a successor to Ross Properties Corp., focusing on real estate investment banking in the US, UK and Paris. He has closed over $3.0 billion of financings for office, hotel, retail, land and multifamily projects. Ross is also a founder of Market Street Investors, a brownfield land development company, and has been involved in the acquisition of notes on defaulted loans and various REO assets in conjunction with several major investors. Ross was an adjunct professor in the graduate program at the NYU Hotel School. He is a member of Urban Land Institute and was a member of the leadership of his ULI council. In 1999, he conceived and co-authored with PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Hotel Mortgage Performance Report, a major study of hotel mortgage default rates.